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China’s Experiments with Weather Modification: A Cause for Concern October 12, 2009 Ajey Lele

An important facet of China’s conduct of the Olympics last year and of the 60th year celebration earlier this month was successful weather control and modification. Though weather control was exercised to ensure the smooth conduct of the two major events, if employed on a larger scale such ‘mastery over weather’ would have strategic implications.

A major attraction of the National Day Parade was the aircraft fly past scheduled at 1100 AM. Air Force meteorologists found in the morning hours that clouds were approaching Tiananmen area from the south-west. Between 0730 and 0900 hours, they launched four ‘attacks’ on the bank of clouds. To keep skies clear of cloud and rain, 432 rockets were fired at these clouds. Eyewitnesses stated that a few hours before the start of the parade the weather was extremely gloomy and visibility was poor due to pollution. There were thick clusters of cloud and some mist, and rain appeared imminent. But subsequently clear weather prevailed and people felt that the clouds had been held back from the square. Probably, the firing of rockets at the clouds made them evaporate or alternately precipitate before reaching the parade ground. Thus, these weather modification experiments allowed the conduct of the parade under clear weather conditions.

Chinese agencies had made a great deal of preparations to thwart any adverse weather approaching the parade ground. They had 48 specialized vehicles ready to throw streams of air to chase away any approaching fog. Efforts were also made to ensure that visibility would remain fine and the surroundings would remain devoid of any mist or haze. Eighteen aircraft were kept ready to sprinkle adequate quantities of dry ice, salt and silver iodide over cloud tops to evaporate them before they start moving in the direction of the parade area.

Similarly, on August 8, 2008, the day of the Olympics opening ceremony, it was reported that the Chinese Weather Modification office had fired a total of 1,104 rain dispersal rockets. These rockets were fired to stop raid clouds approaching the Olympics arena. This operation lasted for eight hours and rockets were launched from 21 different sites. It is probably because of such an ‘attack’ that these rain bearing clouds precipitated at those locations where they were hovering at the time the rockets were fired at them. Excessive rainfall was in fact witnessed in these areas, with some locales measuring more than 100 millimetres. August is the rainy season in Beijing and the meteorological observatory had predicted rainy weather for the Olympics opening ceremony night. Actual humidity around the stadium was touching 90 per cent in a further indication that rains were likely to come.

The success achieved by Chinese meteorologists during the Olympics and now during the 60th National Day Parade underlines the importance the Chinese state is paying to artificial weather manipulation. Chinese sources indicate that more than 37,000 people are currently employed in weather modification activities nationwide. China has full-fledged weather modification units located in more than 30 provinces and municipalities. Some 30 aircraft have been modified to undertake various weather modification experiments. Approximately 7,000 anti-aircraft guns and 5,000 special rocket launchers are at the service of Chinese meteorologists. In order to have the world’s largest artificial weather modification programme, China invests US $63 million a year.

Such investments could allow China to maintain a weather of its own choice to a certain extent. Despite the limitations of the science of cloud seeding in creating artificial rainfall or in stopping rainfall, it appears that the Chinese are trying their best to master this art. Further success in this field will have significant relevance to Chinese agriculture. Moreover, weather modification has a military side to it as well.

The US Air Force had used various weather modification techniques to modify the weather for military purposes during the Vietnam War. Cloud seeding was undertaken over Vietnam at the beginning of 1967 under ‘Project Popeye’. Here, the purpose was to prolong the monsoon season, bring down more rains and cause flash floods to block enemy supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. According to some estimates, this gave significant dividends to the US forces, probably worth three years of sustained bombing.

There is a United Nations Convention called Environmental Modification or ENMOD convention, which entered into force on October 5, 1978. It prohibits states from ‘engaging in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party’. Many countries including India, Pakistan and US are signatories to this convention. But China is not.

China’s weather modification actions during the October 1 National Day Parade or earlier during the Olympics did not cause any damage or injury to other states, nor were there any militaristic intentions behind them. However, when such techniques are used for military gains they fall into the category of ‘Weather Weapons’. Weather modification techniques could be used for changing the direction of cyclonic storms, create snow storms, flash floods and even forest fires in enemy territory. There are reports that countries like the United States are conducting experiments to control the characteristics of the ionosphere which could allow them to control enemy communications. However, there are significant technological limitations in employing such ‘weapons’ with precision.

But it appears that China is working towards overcoming such limitations. Today, apart from China many other countries including the United States are conducting research on weather modification. It needs to be understood that weather modification is a dual use technique; it would be extremely difficult to identify the intentions of the state undertaking such experimentations. The need for including issues related to weather modification in the ‘security lexicon’ has not been felt so far. The Chinese investment in this technology and its successful demonstration during the 2008 Olympics and the 60th National Day Parade raise some concerns. There is no guarantee that China would desist from using weather modification techniques in conflict situations to gain a military advantage. Even during peacetime, such techniques can be used to create artificial drought or floods to affect the economy of the adversary. In particular, states bordering China need to be careful. The weather knows no borders and weather patterns in a neighbouring state can be affected by experiments conducted on own territory. China thus needs to clear suspicions that have been aroused by its weather modification actions. To begin with it could sign and ratify the ENMOD Convention.

East Asia, North America & Strategic Technologies Climate Change, Environmental Warfare, Weather Modification, China system/files/files/images/alele.jpg Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroads Alok Bansal

The book is about Balochistan, the largest province in Pakistan. Baloch never wanted to join Pakistan and since its creation have challenged the Pakistani authority in almost every decade of Pakistan’s existence as an independent entity. The region is once again in the throes of violence. Baloch alienation with Pakistan is almost complete and external players are fishing in the troubled waters. The book covers the developments in post colonial Balochistan, its geo-political significance, and the underlying grievances of the Baloch. It makes an attempt to analyse the reasons for current revival of violence in Balochistan and highlights the current situation in the region. It also attempts to forecast the possible implications of continuing violence in Balochistan on Pakistan and the region.

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South Asia Balochistan, Pakistan system/files/files/images/book_balochistaninturmoil.gif Space Security: Need for a Proactive Approach

Report of the IDSA-Indian Pugwash Society Working Group on Space Security

About the Book

The existing space regime is facing new challenges as a result of the recent advances in space techno-logy and the emergence of space security is a critical dimension in national security calculus. This necessitates a proactive approach and a comprehensive space policy.

This volume is an attempt in this direction to sensitise experts, policy makers and interested general audiences about the developments and debates in this area and their implications for India. The objective of this report, prepared by a Working Group comprising leading experts in the field is to provide a multi-disciplinary analysis including the technological, legal, political, diplomatic, and security dimensions.

Content in Detail

Contributors

Foreword

Preface

1. Space Security: Need for a Proactive Approach

2. Space Policies

3. Space Capabilities

4. Developments in Space Technologies of Security Impact

5. International Space Law Regime: India’s Approach

6. The Emerging Global Space Order: Implications for India

7. Recommendations

Appendices

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967)

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979)

Model Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Incidents and Dangerous Military Practices in Outer Space, May 19, 2004

The 2006 US National Space Policy: www.ostp/gov

The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects

Contributors

Arvind Gupta is a senior diplomat with expertise on security issues and is Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA, New Delhi.

Amitav Malik is a former member of National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and Director Defence Science Centre, New Delhi.

Ranjana Kaul is a partner, Dua Associates, New Delhi.

Rajaram Nagappa is a former associate director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre and currently Visiting Professor, NIAS, Bangalore.

Manpreet Sethi is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi.

P.K. Sundaram is a Senior Research Fellow at the Indian Pugwash Society, New Delhi.

Ajey Lele is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.

Observers

V. Gopalakrishnan is a Scientist (Office of the Scientific Secretary), Inidan Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Banglore.

Navjot Singh, Dir., IW&IT, Integrated Defence Services (IDS).

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North America & Strategic Technologies Space Security system/files/files/images/book_spacesecurity.gif Caretaking Democracy: Political Process in Bangladesh, 2006-08 Sreeradha Datta

About the Book

Until elections to the ninth Jatiya Sangsad were held on 29 December 2008, Bangladesh remained under a caretaker arrangement post the completion of BNP coalition government’s term in October 2006. The ten weeks of President Iajuddin Ahmed headed Caretaker Government was followed by the Second Caretaker Government led by Fakhruddin Ahmed. This government functioning like an interim government navigated Bangladesh through its worst political crisis since 1991 and held free and fair elections in December 2008. Despite several drawbacks, this government introduced a number of political reforms, far reaching anti-corruption measures and strengthened key institutions in the country.

Contents Page with Chapter abstracts

Acknowledgements

1. Introduction

2. The October Crisis
When Prime Minister Khaleda Zia demitted office in October 2006, neither the government nor the principal opposition party could agree on a candidate for the position of Chief Advisor to the neutral administration which would conduct elections to the Ninth Jatiya Sangsad. President Iajuddin Ahmed concurrently appointing himself as Chief Advisor to the Caretaker Government did not resolve the crisis. Between November and early January Bangladesh faced an impending civil war situation. The political uncertainty also underscored the serious and fundamental crises facing democracy in Bangladesh.

3. Caretaker Government to the Interim Government
From the very beginning the second Caretaker Government transformed itself into an interim government and sought to go beyond the constitutionally restricted role of organising free and fair elections. The interim government immediately embarked upon a series of sweeping political and electoral reforms, including wide ranging anti-corruption measures against political figures, prominent individuals and institutions. During its 23-month tenure, the Caretaker Government functioned largely as an interim government taking key decisions concerning the domestic, military, economic, and foreign policies of the country. The interim government was also able to gain widespread public support with its neutrality while addressing corruption and malpractices in the country.

4. The Army: Power behind the Throne
The Caretaker Government had to entrust and heavily rely on the Army for implementing many of its actions and policies. The army was entrusted with a major role in the Caretaker Government’s reform endeavours. At the same time the military has recognised its limitations and public opposition to authoritarianism. These two forces, namely, the military’s involvement in politics and public opposition to it were played out during the period under review. The former was exhibited through the unstinting army support to this government. Indeed, public disapproval manifested in the army’s refusal of active intervention in the political system.

5. Rising to the Economic Challenges
During the 23 months in office, the Caretaker Government faced a number of challenges which demanded immediate and concerted attention. Therefore, even though the economy of the nation was not its major agenda, the success of the CG squarely rested on the manner in which it handled the economic crisis Apart from introducing reforms within the political system the CG also had to confront rising economic turbulence. Despite severe natural calamities and global food crises the Government was able maintain a reasonable economic growth for the country and efficiently handle the impending problems

6. Synergy with India
Under the Caretaker Government, Indo-Bangladesh bilateral relations improved considerably. While no major bilateral problem was resolved, there was an overall improvement in the atmosphere in sharp contrast to relations that existed during the previous BNP government. India’s approach to Bangladesh was one of understanding and accommodation. This was duly reciprocated by the Caretaker Government, which contributed to a growing synergy between the two. While there may have not been any substantial leap forward between the two neighbours but certain incremental steps were taken that contributed to creating a conducive atmosphere for future deeper engagement with each other.

7. Prognosis
The Caretaker Government largely functioning as an interim government worked towards holding free and fair elections. In the process, it introduced far-reaching changes. At one level, it operated under internal emergency that suspended a number of fundamental rights, banned political activities and incarcerated a number of leaders. At the same time, it strengthened key institutions and made them effective and credible. Even if strengthening of democracy was not its raison d’être the CG provided a framework for the consolidation of democracy. Usurping the powers of an elected government, it presented the country with structural arrangements that are essential for democratic governance. The final edifice would thus rests on the evolution of a democratic culture within Bangladesh.

8. Annexures

Index

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South Asia E-Book system/files/files/images/book_caretakingdemocracy_0.gif Security Implications of Climate Change for India Report of the IDSA Working Group

Publication | Page 547 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (1)

About the Book

The IDSA Working Group on Security Implications of Climate Change for India felt that while it would be proper to oppose the securitisation of climate change, it would be prudent not to ignore its likely security dimensions. The Working Group Report identifies India's key vulnerabilities. Future projections of surface warming over India indicate that the annual mean area averaged surface warming is likely to be between 2 degrees and 3 degrees celcius and 3.5 and 5.5 degrees celcius by the middle and end of 21st century respectively. Trends in sea level rise indicate a possible rise between 1.06 to 2.75 mm per year. Every 1.0 degree rise in temperature would reduce wheat production by 4 to 5 million tonnes. Water scarcity will threaten food supplies in India. A quarter of our biodiversity could be lost.

The Working Group felt that climate change cannot be delinked from the overall energy security and economic growth. The National Action Plan on Climate Change is a good beginning but its time-bound implementation needs to be ensured. India needs to improve energy efficiency in the industrial, household and transport sectors. The Working Group also looked at the possible adverse impact on the strategy and tactics of Indian armed forces. India should use climate change as an opportunity to make socio-economic development more sustainable.

Content Page

About the Contributors

Foreword

Preface

Abbreviations

1. Climate Change and Security: Exploring the Link
— Arvind Gupta and Sujit Dutta

2. Key Vulnerabilities Due to Climate Change
— Murari Lal and Sunil Chauhan

3. Climate Change and Disasters
— Sunil Chauhan

4. Climate Change and Migration
— P.K. Gautam

5. Energy and Climate Change
— Shebonti Ray Dadwal

6. Economics and Adaptation to Climate Change
— Purnamita Dasgupta

7. Impact on India’s Bilateral Relations with Neighbouring Countries
— Uttam Kumar Sinha, Sreeradha Datta, Sunil Chauhan and P.K. Gautam

8. Impact on Warfighting Capability of the Indian Military
— Sunil Chauhan, P.K. Gautam and Ajey Lele

9. Climate Change: India’s Negotiating Position
— Arvind Gupta, Sujit Dutta and Uttam Kumar Sinha

10. Conclusion
— Arvind Gupta, Sunil Chauhan and P.K. Gautam

Appendices

Appendix A: Bali Action Plan

Appendix B: Indicative Timetable for Meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention in 2008

Appendix C: CO2 Excluding Lulucf (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) in Gg CO2 Equivalent of some Annex 1 Countries in Giga Grams (1 Giga Gram=10 Billion Grams)

Glossary

Non-Traditional Security Climate Change, India system/files/files/images/book_climatechange.gif International and Regional Security Dynamics: Indian and Iranian Perspectives Meena Singh Roy

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The rapidly changing international and regional environment and concomitant strategic imperatives have been the driving factors/forces in bringing Iran and India to reorient their foreign policy towards each other. While there is a convergence on the core values, concerns and interests, there are some misperceptions and differences as well. These obstacles and hindrances that restrict the forward movement of the age-old relationship between India and Iran cannot simply be wished away. This book projects Iranian and Indian perspectives on issues of mutual interests, and attempts to enhance understanding of the emerging international and regional security challenges and discuss options to address these challenges through mutual cooperation. The book draws attention towards the entire spectrum of the India-Iran relations covering cooperative endeavours in energy sector to common concerns in Afghanistan, Pakistan and developments in Central and West Asia. Crucial policy options are also provided by Indian and Iranian experts to take the relationship between India and Iran forward.

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Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN E-Book system/files/files/images/book_internationalandregio.gif Cribbing Over Conditionalities October 08, 2009 Sushant Sareen

With both houses of the US Congress having passed the ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act,’ Pakistan will soon start receiving an annual economic assistance package of US $1.5 billion for the next five years. Normally a legislation such as this which triples the quantum of aid should be warmly welcomed by both the recipient country and the donor country. But the Kerry-Lugar bill has so far only caused immense heart-burn – in Pakistan where the conditionalities contained in the bill are seen as demeaning, or worse, an assault on the country’s sovereignty and that too for a ‘pittance’; among influential US Congressmen and Senators who continue to doubt Pakistan's commitment to fight Islamist terror groups; and, predictably enough, in India there is a sense of disquiet over the enhanced US assistance to Pakistan which many Indians feel will ultimately be used against India.

Perhaps the Pakistanis have a point when they say that $1.5 billion per year is not going to go very far in achieving the ambitious objective of promoting “long-term development and infrastructure projects, including in healthcare, education, water management and energy programmes in all areas of Pakistan.” Given the extent of the mess in Pakistan, an economic aid package of around $5 billion might have just about helped turn things around. Of course, in the din surrounding the ‘paltry’ sum offered through the Kerry-Lugar bill, what is being ignored is that direct economic assistance is only one part of US aid to Pakistan. The US plays an important role in making available finance from multilateral institutions like IMF, World Bank and ADB, which in turn raise confidence on Pakistan in international financial markets and encourages trade and investment. What is more, the US also influences other countries to provide aid and assistance to Pakistan, for instance through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) forum.

While grumbles over the amount of economic assistance is understandable – Pakistanis claim that the War on Terror has cost the country anything between $35 billion to $50 billion – what is not understandable is the whining about how cheaply Pakistan has sold itself to the Americans. This is like saying that if the price was right, they would have no compunctions in swallowing the bitter pill of compromising their self-respect, independence and sovereignty by accepting the conditions enshrined in the aid package. Clearly then, it is not so much the compromise on the principle that bothers the cribbers; rather it is the ‘peanuts’ they are being paid for compromising on the principle that they find so outrageous.

No doubt, prima facie, the conditions imposed in the Kerry-Lugar bill appear harsh and humiliating for the Pakistanis. But viewed in the proper perspective, the complaints over the terms and conditions of the Kerry-Lugar bill are somewhat misplaced, more so since the violation of these conditionalities will affect not the economic assistance programme but only the security-related assistance, the details of which have not been specified. The violations can however be waived off “if the Secretary of State determines that it is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.” In other words, while the conditions list out US concerns and highlight the red-lines that Pakistan should not breach, it is entirely possible that despite Pakistani violations of these red lines, the security assistance will continue as long as US strategic compulsions dictate so. This is exactly what happened during the 1980s on the issue of the Pressler amendment. Of course, Pakistan will once again have been forewarned about aid being replaced by sanctions if it does not adhere to the markers set out in the Kerry-Lugar bill.

Indeed, strict adherence to the conditionalities would be good for Pakistan, good for the US and good even for India. Take, for instance, the US insistence on an elaborate and quite intrusive system of accounting and auditing of the aid package. This is being done to ensure that there is no leakage or diversion of the aid money and that the money is used for the purpose it has been sanctioned. To the extent that this betrays a lack of confidence in the state’s delivery mechanism, it is natural for the Pakistanis to feel slighted. But the fact is that Pakistan has been notorious in misappropriating and diverting previous aid packages. While military and civilian officials and some politicians enriched themselves by siphoning off the money, the aid had little, if any, impact on the general development of the country. Instead of constructing Pakistan, US dollars ended up corrupting Pakistan. This time around the US is not ready to repeat the mistakes of the past and disburse aid merely on the basis of assurances and proposals from Pakistan.

The strict accounting, auditing and monitoring procedures for aid does not however raise the hackles in Pakistan as much as the conditions relating to democratic governance, combating terrorism and dismantling the nuclear proliferation network. On nuclear proliferation, the US Secretary of State will have to certify that “the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.”

In addition, every six months, “the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,” shall submit a report that gives a detailed description of “Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise [and] an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program.” Unless Pakistan wants to restart the nuclear Walmart run by A.Q. Khan with the connivance of Pakistan’s military establishment, it should not really have a problem with this condition. The stopping of proliferation to and from Pakistan is something that India too should welcome wholeheartedly.

The second major objection being raised by Pakistanis relates to the conditionalities seeking to promote democracy in Pakistan and empower the civilian government and institutions. Every year the US Secretary of State is required to certify that “the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” Bi-annually, the Secretary of State will have to send to the appropriate congressional committees a report providing “an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.”

Only someone who seeks to perpetuate the hold of the Army on the politics of the country would object to or resent this conditionality. In any functioning democracy where civilian supremacy is firmly established, such a condition would be meaningless because not only are all top military appointments entirely the prerogative of the civilian government, all important policy decisions too are taken by the civilian authority, albeit after taking inputs from the military brass. But given the peculiarities and weaknesses of Pakistani democracy – the preponderant influence that the Army exercises in the politics of that country – such a condition affirms US commitment to empowering civilian institutions in Pakistan and supporting a stable democratic order. As far as the Americans are concerned, they are trying hard to change the widely, and perhaps correctly, held perception inside Pakistan that they are more favourably inclined to and comfortable dealing with military strongmen who serve as a single window clearance as opposed to civilian politicians who have to try and keep the public mood in mind before taking any decision. For anyone in Pakistan to construe this condition to mean that the US will henceforth interfere in decisions on military promotions is quite preposterous. But even if this were the case, surely senior appointments in the army of people who are opposed to the Islamists and who are apolitical is something that is also in Pakistan's interest.

The third and potentially most critical conditionality is over the issue of terrorism. According to the Kerry-Lugar bill, the Secretary of State has to certify that “the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups ... including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws.”

Every six months the Secretary of State will have to provide to appropriate congressional committees “an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism.”

Clearly, the benchmarks set on the issue of terrorism seek to make the Pakistani government live up to its oft stated commitment to “fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.” In other words, Pakistan will have to act not only against terrorist groups that threaten the United States and itself but also against those groups that indulge in terrorism against India. The reference to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad and the inclusion of places like the LeT headquarters, Muridke, is a clear signal to Pakistan that the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jihadists no longer washes with the US. Although in deference to Pakistani sensitivities, the final version of the Kerry-Lugar bill has removed any specific reference to sponsorship of terrorism against India by Pakistan-based groups, this is hardly a concession to Pakistan. If anything, the US Congress has made the terrorism benchmarks so much more broad-based that very little wriggle room has been left for the Pakistanis (or for that matter even for the US) to continue playing favourites among the jihadists. This means that it is no longer enough to say that there will be no terror against India but also those jihadists who spread terror in Iran (Jundullah) or China (ETIM) will be curbed. This is exactly what is needed if Pakistan has to be transformed back into a modern and moderate state.

Pakistanis are being rather disingenuous when they argue that terrorism related conditions amount to an acceptance of the charges that Pakistan was indeed involved in sponsoring terrorism. It is one thing to be in denial over the activities of jihadists operating as instruments of state policy and quite another trying to deceive the rest of the world of this immutable reality. Of course, the Pakistanis are justified in their apprehension that Pakistan will be held hostage to any act of terror in neighbouring countries by jihadist groups based in Pakistan acting on their own and without any state support, involvement or sponsorship. But the fact is that no one (not even India) expects Pakistan to deliver overnight on these terrorism conditionalities. What everyone expects however is a sincere and serious effort by Pakistan to dismantle the physical, political, and ideological infrastructure that provides sustenance to the jihadist groups. This includes ending the fiction of holding companies of terror groups like Jamaatud Dawa as being mere charities. There is little doubt that the terrorism conditionalities impose a very onerous responsibility on the Pakistani authorities. It is going to be a very tall order for Pakistan to clean up its act, but this is unavoidable if Pakistan does not want to acquire the status of a jihadist state.

Rather than being apprehensive, India should in fact welcome the Kerry-Lugar bill and the conditionalities it contains. The monitoring mechanism being put in place will address many of India’s concerns about the economic aid being diverted for military purposes. The quantum of aid is such that it will at best keep Pakistan on life support and reduce it into a dependency of the US, which is not a bad thing for India. After all, India has been unable to influence developments in Pakistan or enforce compliance on Pakistan to its demands. As a result, India depends on the US and other Western countries to pressure Pakistan on issues of concern to India. The more Pakistan becomes dependant on the US, the more the possibility of India being able to use US influence on Pakistan for its own ends. The only two other countries that can exercise influence on Pakistan are China and Saudi Arabia, and neither is likely to intercede on India’s behalf with Pakistan. To the extent that US assistance and influence will lead to modern schools replacing madrasas, health facilities being created, urban decay being arrested, economic growth providing employment to young people and weaning them away from throwing themselves into the fires of jihad, a stable democratic order, reduction in the political role of the army, dismantling of the nuclear proliferation networks and winding down of the jihad infrastructure, there is little reason for India to complain.

With the Kerry-Lugar bill being passed, the ball will now be in Pakistan’s court, which will have to decide whether to accept or reject the conditions contained in the bill. Despite all the angst over the conditionalities in the bill, chances are that Pakistan will accept the bill. The Pakistan of 2009 simply does not have the economic, military and strategic space that was available to the Pakistan of 1980 when Ziaul Haq could reject the initial US offer of economic assistance by calling it ‘peanuts’. The fact of the matter is that on its own resources Pakistan is no longer a sustainable entity. While Pakistan could still try and develop a taste for grass by rejecting US assistance, there is no way it can economically sustain the fight against the Islamist insurgency without external assistance. Insurgencies sap the energy of the state and weaken it to a point where it collapses. The only way a state can beat this outcome is through external help, which enables it to counter the economic drain that an insurgency imposes. This is something that the Pakistanis should bear in mind before they mindlessly oppose the American munificence. What is more, Pakistan needs to work out the fallout of the US calling its bluff in the event that the aid package is rejected.

South Asia Pakistan-US Relations, Pakistan, Terrorism, United States of America (USA) system/files/files/images/pak.gif Obama and Nuclear Disarmament: Drivers and Substance October 08, 2009 S. Samuel C. Rajiv

From the streets of Prague to the halls of the United Nations, President Barack Obama has actively espoused the cause of nuclear disarmament. In his landmark speech at Prague on April 5, Obama gave the call for a world free of nuclear weapons and eloquently stated his intention to pursue such a goal vigorously. In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, Obama listed non-proliferation and disarmament as the first of the four pillars that leaders must strive to erect to ensure a secure future for the world’s children. The next day, he chaired a Summit meeting of Heads of Government of the 15-member UN Security Council, a first for a US President and only the fifth time that such a meeting has been held in the Council’s 63 year history. UNSC Resolution 1887 passed at the meeting called for a revitalized commitment to work towards a world without nuclear weapons, urged progress on nuclear arms reductions, sought a strengthened non-proliferation treaty (NPT), demanded full compliance on Security Council resolutions on Iran and North Korea, encouraged efforts to ensure peaceful uses of nuclear energy, reaffirmed the essential role of the IAEA in preventing nuclear proliferation, urged strengthened controls to govern the export of nuclear materials, reiterated support for bringing to fruition the provisions of UN Security Resolution 1540, among others. The Obama White House has also actively pursued arms control measures, with Washington and Moscow agreeing on a successor treaty to START 1 in July 2009 under the terms of which each side will reduce its nuclear warheads to between 1,500 and 1,650.

Drivers of Obama’s Disarmament Activism

The drivers behind President Obama’s disarmament activism are varied. The dangers of proliferation in West Asia/Middle East and Northeast Asia and the complications this would entail for US foreign policy and regional stability are prime factors that seem to have revived American memories about obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Obama has stated that “it will be naïve for us to think that we can grow our nuclear stockpiles … and be able to pressure countries like Iran and North Korea not to pursue nuclear weapons themselves.” Not coincidentally, Obama’s April 5 speech was on the same day that North Korea made another demonstration of its brinkmanship – a missile test mocking international efforts aimed at constraining its behaviour. Obama on September 26 also termed Iran’s Qom facility, the existence of which was revealed by Tehran to the IAEA on September 21, “a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime and continues a disturbing pattern of Iranian evasion". Iran has since agreed to allow the IAEA to inspect the site on October 25.

The Obama administration’s policy activism on issues like nuclear disarmament, energy security and climate change is also testament to efforts geared towards shaping a legacy distinct from that of the previous administration. (See “Obama First 100 Days,” IDSA Strategic Comments, May 1, 2009). It has followed a policy of pragmatic and renewed engagement on intractable issues like Israel-Palestine, as well as in its dealings with Iran and North Korea, to the chagrin of critics and allies who perceive threats from the continued intransigence of these antagonists.

Analysts have also pointed out that Obama’s personal convictions have shaped his stance on disarmament. At Prague, he argued against the “fatalism” that the spread of nuclear weapons and technology cannot be stopped and the “moral responsibility” of the US to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Some reports suggest that Obama’s views on nuclear disarmament need not be seen as acquired traits quickened by realist compulsions, but a viewpoint which he has consistently argued since his student days, through his time as a Senator and during the presidential campaign as well. The New York Times for instance (July 5, 2009) has pointed to his 1983 article “Breaking the War Mentality” in a Columbia University student magazine, wherein he argued against the “relentless, often silent spread of militarism” in the US and called for a “nuclear weapons free world.” In 2005 while serving in the Senate, Obama espoused the view that “any attempt by the US government to develop or produce new nuclear weapons only undermines US non-proliferation efforts around the world.”

World Reactions: Mixed and Mostly Sceptical

The reactions from other Nuclear Weapons States to Obama’s calls on disarmament have been mixed. A conventionally inferior Russia, fast losing the accoutrements of its great power status, continues to hold fast to the sole card that is a remnant of its past glory. Moscow is continuing its nuclear forces modernisation, with a new generation of ICBMs, the RS-24, scheduled to be inducted in December 2009. President Medvedev at the UN Security Council on September 24 argued that in order to give impetus to the nuclear disarmament process, the “principles of equal security, mutual respect and compliance with the norms of international law” should be given prime importance.

President Sarkozy had earlier expressed open scepticism about Obama’s plans, terming them as “naïve.” At the UN Security Council meeting, Sarkozy stated that President Obama “dreams of a world without weapons … but right in front of us two countries [Iran, North Korea] are doing the exact opposite.” The French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2008 also reiterates the importance of nuclear weapons for French national security and strategic autonomy.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, at the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2009, ranked nuclear proliferation at the third position out of five “urgent challenges that demand momentous decisions” (as against Obama’s first pillar). He urged “statesmanship, not brinkmanship” to achieve “the ambition of a nuclear-free world.” Brown stated his country’s interest to sponsor a uranium bank and establish a nuclear centre for excellence to develop proliferation-resistant technologies and to consider reducing the British nuclear submarine fleet, pending a review.

China has squarely placed the onus for progress on disarmament on the United States and Russia. President Hu on September 24 for instance stated that in order to maintain global balance and stability, the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) “with the largest arsenals should reduce those arsenals, after which the countries with smaller arsenals should also begin to reduce their stocks.” Judging by the equipment on show at the Chinese National Day parade on October 1, where new missiles, including ICBMs, were displayed for the first time, it seems Beijing is in no mood to follow through on its advice to its peers.

India’s Permanent Representative at the United Nations Hardeep Puri welcomed Obama’s initiative at the Security Council and reiterated the country’s “unwavering commitment to global efforts for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” He however called for the “global elimination of nuclear weapons on a non-discriminatory basis” and asserted that India cannot accept calls for universalization of the NPT. Puri pointed out that nuclear weapons “are an integral part of India’s national security and will remain so, pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament.” . Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, meanwhile on September 29, 2009, promised India’s constructive participation in the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament.

An Assessment

Obama is the first American president to actively pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament. His initiative at the UN Security Council was praised by former high-ranking US officials, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, who noted that steps like UNSC 1887 can help build the “necessary political will” to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.

However, roadblocks on the road to disarmament nirvana, as envisaged by Obama, remain. Domestic opposition to his efforts is strong, with Republican politicians criticising him for pursuing “dangerous, wishful thinking.” Getting the required 67 votes for a Senate ratification of the CTBT continues to present a difficult challenge. The US and other Nuclear Weapon States continue to hold nuclear weapons dear and Washington has also not agreed to adopt a no-first-use posture yet, a stance being advocated by scholars like Scott Sagan, and neither does UNSCR 1887 require NWS to do so. Obama himself has affirmed that the US will retain its deterrent capacity “as long as there is a country with nuclear weapons.” The administration’s policy of engagement with Iran and North Korea could backfire if these countries fail to reciprocate in which case the current imbroglios would persist and in fact get worse.

NPT dilemmas seem starker than ever as May 2010 approaches. As Manmohan Singh pointed out on September 29, 2009, for global non-proliferation efforts to be successful, they should be “universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory and linked to complete nuclear disarmament," a proposition which is currently not operational. Iran and Arab nations continue to point out the need to involve Israel in any disarmament mechanism.

Obama’s call at the UN General Assembly to ensure that the “future does not belong to fear” is eloquent. But after living by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence religiously for the past 60 years and still being regulated by its tenets, for America to champion the cause of disarmament does seem out of place. However, it is also a fact that without American interest and support, whatever be the driving rationale, achieving any goals on the road to nuclear disarmament is almost impossible. While Obama has been candid enough to admit that he harbours “no illusions about the difficulty of bringing about a world without nuclear weapons,” it remains to be seen if the momentum that he has sought to create can be sustained into May 2010 and beyond.

North American Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear, Obama Administration, United Nations, Nuclear Disarmament, United States of America (USA) system/files/files/images/sscrajiv.jpg Profiling the Taliban Threat to India June 02, 2009 Harinder Singh

Despite some recent reverses in NWFP, the Taliban has emerged as a force to reckon with in Pakistan. Their formidable presence, an estimated 3000 fighters in Swat Valley, as observed by President Asif Ali Zardari during his visit to Washington, predicts a long drawn battle for Pakistan’s security forces. Should the Pakistan Army fail to contain their spread, as is much feared, it could pose a serious challenge to other countries in the neighbourhood. The crumbling frontline of the global war against terror sounds an alarm for the Indian state as well, for it to be prepared and respond effectively in times of crises.

Taliban and Terror

The Taliban’s capacity to cause death and destruction cannot be underestimated. In their ignorance of values, the Taliban is “virtually destroying anything that they find distasteful and does not fall in line with their way of thinking”. In a recent incident near Peshawar, the mausoleum of seventeenth century legendary sufi poet Rehman Baba was attacked and badly damaged, apparently because they took offence to shrine culture, and the fact that women were also praying at the mausoleum. In yet another incident, several shops selling music and film videos at Takhtbahi (a small town northwest of Peshawar) were blown up. In the past the Taliban have attacked scores of shops in the frontier provinces, charging that entertainment is contrary to the teachings of Islam. The Taliban did not spare even the town of Mardan (located 50 kilometres south of Swat), a prominent military cantonment in NWFP and, from where the counter offensive against the Taliban has been launched. In one such incident in Mardan, suspected militants targeted the girl’s high school in the town, a day after another school outside the cantonment was attacked. Taliban guerrillas also claimed responsibility for bombing the office of National Rural Support Programme, and killing a woman staff member in a village near Mardan. The Taliban have always been critical of non-governmental organizations, which encourage a more public role for women. Most interestingly, because of worries that the Taliban are coming, it is reported that land prices have dropped by as much as 25 per cent in Mardan. The latest threat from the Taliban is targeted at medical doctors in the city of Peshawar. Threatening letters sent to several prominent hospitals want doctors to stop wearing western clothes or else be prepared to face suicide attacks. The Taliban seem hell bent on pushing the state apparatus to the edge and cause total administrative collapse in the frontier provinces. The prevailing situation looks grim and surely needs to be treated with concern.

Modus Operandi

Traditionally, the Taliban have always sought to control territory and defend key terrain objectives and, not merely indulge in hit and run tactics. Several battles fought by the Taliban against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, prominently at Cobaki, Chapchall and Bai Beche in October 2001, Sayed Slim Kalay and Highway 9 in December 2001, as also Operation Anaconda in March 2002, are indicative of the pattern of operations. In recent times, the Taliban’s engagement of Pakistan security forces in NWFP demonstrates their continued penchant for controlling territory and population centres. A few issues in the context of their modus operandi are:

  • Control of territory seems central to the Taliban’s operational thinking, as this implies a share in local revenues, dispensation of tribal justice and adjudication of land cases and above all, unquestioned control over poppy cultivation and the booming drug trade.
  • Fixation of Pashtun militants to fight from well prepared positions was seen in Kashmir as well. In the late 1990s, these cadres operated extensively from higher reaches of the Pir Panjal and Shamshabari mountain ranges. Their other favourite haunts being thickly forested areas of Surankote, Haphruda, Bandipore and Lolab in the shadow of these ranges. Their compulsion to operate from high mountains stemmed from the fact that, distinct physical features, language and mannerisms made them easily recognisable and, thus an easy target for the security forces.
  • In fact, the problem of identity made it extremely difficult for them to operate and undertake actions in isolation. However, a few sensational acts by Pashtun militants did catch the attention of the public and media, such as those at Hazratbal Shrine and Hill Kaka. The fidayeen and IED attacks introduced by these cadres too had a significant impact. India’s past experience in dealing with these cadres in Jammu and Kashmir surely gives it an advantage in the emerging context. However, the new breed of militants look far more experienced and motivated and in that sense, would be much more difficult to tackle than their predecessors.

The Indian Context

The growing chorus that the Pakistan Army does not have the capacity to fight unrest in frontier provinces raises several questions. While the US policy intends to build such capacities, it may take time before results actually show up on ground. Pakistan surely needs to stand up to the threat and save the state from a possible collapse. Can the political and military hierarchy in Pakistan handle the fragile situation? What does the situation portend for other countries in the region? What factors could drive further worsening of the situation? Does Taliban, a loose alliance of disparate militant groups, possess the organisational and ideational capacity to carry `terror’ to distant lands? And, should the Pakistan establishment fail to contain the threat, what dimension could the problem assume in the sub-continental context? These are some key questions which need to be addressed.

While it may be too early to speculate about the unfolding Taliban threat, it is however important to examine a few plausible scenarios as far as India is concerned. Hypothetically, the threat could unfold in two major ways. One, it could manifest as heightened infiltration attempts along the Line of Control, as witnessed during the late 1990s, when militants from the Pashtun belt infiltrated in significant numbers and proactively engaged the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. And two, it could evolve as a secondary effect due to increased violence and instability in Pakistan; the scenario presumes that the Taliban ideology shall first afflict the plains of Pakistan and, is then carried forward to the Indian hinterland by a new breed of `Talibanised’ militants from mainland Pakistan. The two scenarios could well evolve in unison and present a larger challenge.

Jammu and Kashmir

The Kashmiri terrorist leadership has always had a strong connection with militant outfits hailing from Afghanistan, most prominently the Hizb-e-Islami (HeI) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJi). Cadres of several militant groups from Jammu and Kashmir attended madrassas in NWFP, and even trained at camps in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. It may be recalled that Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM), also signed the Al-Qaeda’s declaration of 1998, which called upon Muslims to attack the Americans and their allies. Maulana Masood Azhar, who founded Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), supposedly traveled to Afghanistan several times to meet Osama bin Laden, while the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) recruited volunteers to fight alongside the ban. In that sense, there was always a strong connection between Pashtun militants and Kashmir. These cadres were known to infiltrate with Kashmiri militant groups such as Jamaat-ul-Mujaheedin (JuM), Tehrik-e-Mujaheedin (TeM) and Tehrik-e-Jehad (TeJ), and operated extensively in the hinterland along with LeT, Al-Badr, HuM, HuA and HM cadres. The newly formed Taliban groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohamamadi (TNSM) do carry the ability to recast old alliances, even if some outfits are no longer active, and this probability cannot be wished away.

With infiltration attempts being reported along the Line of Control, influx of Taliban cadres cannot be ruled out. Should this happen in significant numbers, these cadres could gravitate towards their traditional haunts, in general, areas of Rajauri, Surankote, Lolab, Haphruda, Bandipore, Tral and Kangan. Their intent would always be to draw the Security Forces deeper into the hinterland and thus dilute the counterinsurgency grid. Some cadres may even push towards the adjoining districts of Himachal Pradesh to expand their influence in the region. To further widen the scope, we may even witness sporadic infiltration attempts in the Ladakh region. Heightened infiltration attempts would perhaps be the first indication of ingress of Taliban cadres. With security forces’ operations being effectively coordinated along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, there is no immediate cause of concern. The Indian security forces seem well poised to handle the situation. However, a few issues which may require attention are:

  • The need to strengthen existing security mechanisms, in particular gathering of actionable intelligence and its timely dissemination requires no emphasis. Those areas which have been lying dormant for several years now could also be exploited. Militant groups are known to exploit such gaps and opportunities and, we need to guard against it. Surveillance over traditional routes of infiltration, increased availability of rotary wing aircraft to meet operational contingencies, provision of high definition night vision devices, durable body protection and gear, improved communications at the tactical level, electronic interception cum monitoring facilities, robotic devices for counter IED operations, etc are some capabilities that may need immediate attention. Augmentation of existing capabilities, as also exploitation of the new enabling technologies, would go a long way in reinforcing the ongoing security forces’ operations in Jammu and Kashmir.
  • There is also perhaps the need to re-visit our counterinsurgency strategy in Jammu and Kashmir. Counter infiltration operations require a technology intensive approach (not forgetting the need for boots on ground) to enable effective surveillance over areas that facilitate infiltration, as also the ability of forces to undertake effective neutralisation operations. Equally important is the need to progressively reduce militant strength in the hinterland through sustained operations. This calls for greater inter-agency coordination and seamless operations at the tactical level to draw maximum dividends. The unified approach is crucial towards tackling militancy in Jammu and Kashmir.
  • And lastly, given the volatile situation in NWFP, there may not be too many separatist leaders willing to ride the Pakistan boat, giving India much needed time and opportunity to re-think the future of Jammu and Kashmir. India needs to focus on socio-economic issues, wherein the security forces too could play an important support role for overall development of the region. Besides the ongoing operations, there is a need to `connect’ with the local populace in a more positive and visible manner. Building bridges at all conceivable levels is of utmost importance towards creating a favourable operating environment for the security forces in the emerging context.

The Indian Hinterland

Ever since Pakistan outlawed three Islamist militant groups namely, Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), terrorist attacks in the Indian hinterland have been carried out by cover groups, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Indian Mujaheedin. In recent years, as Jayshree Bajoria of the Council on Foreign Relations observes, “many new terrorist groups have emerged in Pakistan, several existing groups have re-constituted, and a whole new crop of militants – more violent and less amenable to political solutions - have risen.” Many experts feel that it is difficult to determine how many terrorist groups are currently operating in Pakistan. As Ashley J. Tellis summarizes, these can be placed under five distinct categories: sectarian, anti-Indian, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the Pakistani Taliban.

In this context, the rise of Pakistani Taliban, an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 cadres under Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), carries the potential to galvanize several banned or relatively less active militant organizations in Pakistan. Collusion between Taliban and militant outfits from plains of Pakistan can produce a fiery brand of militancy – a potent mix of tribal and urban cultures – which could test the state’s capacity to respond. Taliban ideology per se may not appeal to all outfits; however decades of fighting experience in Afghanistan could influence the character and modus operandi of banned and cover terrorist groups.

Terror patterns are infectious by nature and militant cadres draw pleasure in experimenting with new ideas. Their leadership and propaganda machines too impel them to try out these ideas towards devastating effects. As Steve Coll of the New America Foundation states, “a younger generation of violent and radical militant cadres with no patience” is what we need to watch out for, since they will be more than willing to undertake sensational actions. LeT, HuM and HuA cadres have always been known for their guile and agility, and how much smarter they could get from this alliance, is for all of us to guess!! The Taliban surely has the capacity to transform the modus operandi of Pakistani and Kashmiri militant groups. It is not ideology alone that should worry us, but the modus operandi of militant groups in times to come as well. Terror can shape intent and actions of militant groups in no time and, this is the biggest challenge faced by security forces. Building the state’s capacity for intelligence, policing, security and legal functions is the obvious answer to the problem. Given our geographical and social diversity, available capacities would always fall short to meet emerging threats and uncertainties. Thus the need to evolve `alternate strategies' to deal with evolving trends in terrorism assumes importance.

  • Since an act of terror cannot be predicted or foreseen, one needs sharper eyes and ears to prevent it. The intelligence agencies alone cannot fit this bill and the need to evolve mechanisms for `public watch’, which could caution likelihood of an adverse incident, is relevant. There could be several ways to involve the local populace; unemployed youth, retired people, school children, college students, social activists, religious heads, residential welfare associations, private security companies and above all, the large community of well trained ex-servicemen could be employed innovatively to yield desired security dividends. A concept based on public participation should draw strength from the public per se, to prevent acts of terror, while governmental capacities and the security forces are directed towards dealing with actual acts of terror.
  • The `bhagidari’ system, a well experimented concept in Jammu and Kashmir, is an apt example of the role played by local populace in counter terror operations. Their involvement in sanitization of public places such as busy market places, bus stands, schools and colleges, roads and bridges etc, to facilitate functioning of security forces was noteworthy. This idea of `public watch’ can be replicated with little effort in the metros, cities and towns. Our population is our best bet to counter terror and their unbiased involvement can play a major role in preventing incidents.

Looking Ahead

The evolving situation in the frontier provinces of Pakistan does not portend well. Though it seems that the Pakistan establishment under increasing pressure from US is trying hard to tackle the problem, there is as yet no sign of how sooner the threat could be contained. Terrorism, when under pressure, tends to move to areas which offer least or no resistance and the operational tempo built by Pakistani security forces could act in several different ways. This could either lead to elimination of the Taliban or push them into areas where they could flourish. Those new areas could be anyone’s guess. The worst case for us would be the influx of `Talibanised’ cadres into the Indian hinterland. While the situation in Kashmir could still be controlled, our ability to handle terror in the urban areas is yet to build up. We need to prepare for it, lest it is too late to control the situation. In this context, participation of local communities will be crucial towards evolving an effective counter terror strategy in the changed circumstances.

South Asia, Terrorism & Internal Security India, Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, Terrorism, Taliban Indo-Bhutan Joint Action against Insurgents October 05, 2009 Balaji Chandramohan

After the 6th border meeting in Thimphu on September 12, India and Bhutan have agreed to scale up efforts to secure their borders. India and Bhutan share a 669-km-long border, manned by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) from the Indian side and by the Royal Bhutanese Army on the Bhutan side. Most of the insurgent camps are located along the Bhutan-Assam border, which comprises of 267 km of the Indo-Bhutan border.

The border meeting assumes significance against the backdrop of reports suggesting that insurgents operating in India’s North-Eastern states such as United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFA) and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) have increased co-operation with the Bhutan Tiger Force, the Bhutan Maoist Party and the Communist Party of Bhutan. At the same time, there is a fear in the Bhutanese establishment that the Communist Party of Bhutan, with active co-operation from North Eastern insurgent groups, might acquire advanced weapons and attempt to topple the newly elected democratic government headed by Prime Minister Jigmi Y Thinley. This was emphasized by Home Secretary Penden Wangchuck who headed the Bhutanese delegation for the border talks. Wangchuk was reported by state-run newspaper Kuensel as saying that "The insurgents are linked to Maoists and militants of eastern Nepal and they can pose a threat to security”.

The Indian side headed by Secretary (border management) Vinay Kumar emphasized during the meeting that since the new Bangladesh government headed by Sheikh Hasina had increased the crack down on North-Eastern insurgent groups, these groups have set up bases in Bhutan. This was confirmed by the 48-page ‘restricted’ Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) report on the North-East states in September 2009. Reports note that the emergence of a “friendly” regime in Bangladesh has resulted in nervousness among the Indian insurgent groups operating from that country and “tentative” reports suggest movement of insurgent infrastructure towards Myanmar and Bhutan where the reach of the Government along the border areas is limited.

Earlier in August 2009, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram, during a three-day visit to Bhutan, had raised concerns about the re-entrenchment of Assamese and other north-eastern rebel groups in Bhutan. After the talks, Chidambaram acknowledged that the Bhutan government will not hesitate to act on the Indian insurgent groups in its southern borders. This was confirmed by Bhutan’s Prime Minister Lyonchen Jigme Yoser Thinley in the wake of Chidambaram’s visit.

India and Bhutan are also concerned about Daranga Mela, a trade point on the India-Bhutan border which in recent years has become the base of ULFA’s most wanted commander Hira Sarania who heads the outfit’s 709 battalion. With the death of Paresh Baruah’s top aide in a September 5, 2009 gun-battle with security forces in Guwahati, Sarania is tipped to acquire greater importance in ULFA’s scheme of things. Indian Intelligence source indicate that Sarania is located somewhere in the foothills of Bhutan Himalayas, dodging the security forces of both India and Bhutan. Sarania was instrumental in rebuilding the ULFA’s network in Lower Assam, mainly in areas bordering Bhutan, after the group suffered serious reverses as a result of “Operation All Clear” in 2003.

Earlier on December 15, 2003, India and Bhutan had conducted a joint operation to flush out North-Eastern insurgent groups operating inside Bhutan. “Operation All Clear” could be termed as the dawn of the new Indo-Bhutan 'strategic partnership.' The operation was centered in Southern Bhutan where the insurgent groups’ camps were concentrated. The Royal Bhutan Army conducted the operation within its territory while the Indian Army ensured that the insurgents do not cross over to the Indian side. Reports indicated that 30 camps where insurgents were concentrated were the target of the operation. Out of these, 13 were controlled by ULFA, 12 by the NDFB, and 5 by the KLO. The then Indian Chief of Army Staff, General N.C. Vij officially announced that 650 militants had been “neutralised” - either killed or captured - during the operation. The ULFA and NDFB ‘publicity secretaries’ Mithinga Diamari and B. Erakrdao, and the KLO ‘Chief’ Tom Adhikari were the prominent terrorist leaders arrested during the operation. After the operation, the Bhutan government rightly pointed out in a statement that the militants’ existence in the region not only undermines “the peace, stability and socio-economic development enjoyed by the Bhutanese people”, but also “threatens the very sovereignty of the country.”

The present situation is similar to the one after “Operation Rhino” launched by the Indian Army on September 15, 1991, which forced the ULFA to first base its camps in Southern Bhutan. ULFA then facilitated the entry of its two allies, the NDFB and the KLO. At present, the general fear from the Indian perspective is that ULFA might have set up temporary, though not permanent, camps in Southern Bhutan. The dense forests and rough terrain pose huge hurdles for the security forces to flush out the rebels completely. Under these circumstances, India and Bhutan have to step up patrolling along their border, especially in the Assam sector where the insurgent camps are concentrated. India should also extend support and training to the Royal Bhutan Army to better handle the insurgents encamped within Bhutanese territory.

South Asia Northeast India, India, Bhutan, India-Bhutan Relations, Terrorism
Publication | Page 547 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)

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